It is settled law that Section 5 application is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties.              CDJ 2007 MHC 814
Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras
Case No : C.R.P.(NPD) Nos.738 of 2003 to 740 of 2003
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
Parties : The Secretary Madras Race Club Chennai Versus Saraswathy Kailasam & Others 
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: R. Viduthalai, Senior Counsel for C. Ravichandran, Srinath Sridevan, Advocates. For the Respondents: R. Sriram Panchu, Senior Counsel for R. Yashod Vardhan, Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 18-01-2007
Head Note :- 
Limitation Act – Section 5 – To condone the delay of 1586 days in filing the application for restoration of the appeal - Whether the delay was due to negligence or want of bonafide on the part of the Petitioner - Eviction Petition was filed on 09.07.1987 against the Custodian of the Race Club. At that time, i.e. from 09.04.1986 the Madras Race Club [Acquisitions and Transfer of Undertaking] Act, 1986, was in force - Constitutional validity of Race Club Act was challenged. In the decision [dated 12.01.1996], the Act was struck down as ultra vires - Eviction was ordered on 04.10.1993. Only the Custodian has contested the Eviction Petition and RCA No.123/1994 was filed in 1994 by the Custodian - The Supreme Court Ordered handing over of management before 31.03.1996. Thereafter, the Race Club has regained its managing capacity. From the available records, the actual date of taking over management is not known - Therefore, even after taking over the management, it must have taken quite some time to take stock of the entire affairs and assume effective control over the affairs. The Petitioner Club cannot be blamed for not immediately taking steps in pursuing RCA No.123/1994. During 1996-97, quite probably, the Race Club might have been preoccupied with transition of management and cannot be faulted for not pursuing the RCA - True, the Petitioner has been vigorously pursuing M.P.No.69/2000, in which the purchaser sought assignment of Decree by filing CRP and SLP. Though the Petitioner has fought out M.P.No.69/2000 upto the Supreme Court, the Petitioner did not takes steps to look into the stage of RCA. The reason is explained in Paragraph 3 of the affidavit that the then counsel did not guide the Petitioner in a proper manner and only on engagement of counsel, the Petitioner came to know about the details of rent control proceedings. The explanation offered by the Petitioner is quite acceptable - When RCA was filed, Petitioner Club was not in the picture. Only the Custodian - Government nominee was on record - Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of negligence, inaction or malafide - Though the delay is a long range of delay, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay is properly explained. The Madras Race Club [Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking] Act, 1986, was in force and the Government Custodian – Government Nominee was in management of the affairs of the Race Club. In 1996, there was handing over of management and 1996-1997 was the transition period. After the Petitioner received notices in M.P.No.69/2000 and the execution proceedings, the Petitioner Club had taken all efforts in diligently pursuing the matter. The Petitioner Club cannot be blamed for not taking steps for restoration of the appeal from January 2000 to August 2001 - The Revision Petitioner has made out sufficient cause for condonation of delay. With a view to afford opportunity to the Petitioner Club to contest the eviction Order, the appeal, RCA No.123/1994 has to be restored. The impugned Order is to be set aside and these Revision Petitions are to be allowed - The Rent Control Appellate Authority is directed to restore RCA No.123/1994 on file and proceed with the matter in accordance with law.

Para 10 to 14, 17 to 20

Comparative Citations:
2007 (2) MLJ 472, 2007 (2) CTC 58, 2007 (3) LW 690
Judgment :- 
(Prayer: Revision filed against the order dated 04.01.2002 passed in M.P.Nos.568, 569, 570/2001 in R.C.A.No.123/1994 by the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai.)

Common Order:

Petitioner – Madras Race Club challenges the common Order made in M.P.Nos.568, 569, 570/2001 in R.C.A.No.123/ 1994, by the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, refusing to condone the delay of 1586 days in filing the application for restoration of the appeal and consequently rejecting the applications for restoration of appeal and stay Petition.

2. Since common points are involved in these revisions, the Revision Petitions were heard together and disposed of by this common Order.

3. Before we deal with the contentions and the case laws, brief reference to the factual background is necessary, which is as follows:-

3.1.A large extent of land in Velachery known as "Velachery Bungalow" and the site thereon is stated to be the demised premises. On 09.07.1987 the Respondents 1 to 3 filed R.C.O.P.No.2192/1987 for eviction under Sections 10(2)(1), 10(2)(vii), 10(3)(1)(i) and 10(3)(a)(iii) of Tamil Nadu Buildings [Lease and Rent Control] Act, 1960. R.C.O.P.No. 2192/87 was also filed for fixation of fair rent. At the time of initiation of the proceedings, the Madras Race Club [Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking] Act, 1986, [for short, 'the Race Club Act'] was in force and the Government was in control of the administration and management of the affairs of the Club. Custodian was appointed by the Government, under the Act and he was in-charge of the proceedings in the said RCOP. By the Order dated 04.10.1993, eviction was ordered after contest.

3.2. As against the Order of eviction, RCA No.123/94 was filed. RCA No.80/1994 was filed against the Order fixing fair rent. Claiming that they have purchased the property from the Respondents 1 to 3, Respondents 4 to 10 filed M.P.No.1360/1996 to get themselves impleaded as party Respondents in the said appeal. The impleading application was allowed on 21.07.1996 and the Court has directed the appellant Race Club, then represented by Custodian to carry out the amendment.

3.3. By the Judgment dated 12.01.1996 [decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 1153], the Supreme Court has struck down the Race Club Act on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has further directed the Committee of Management to hand over the management of the Club to a duly constituted Committee. The management of Madras Race Club reverted back to the Petitioner.

3.4. In the meanwhile, by the Order dated 20.03.1997, R.C.A. No.123/1994 was dismissed for default. On 22.12.1999, the fourth Respondent Bukhari filed M.P.No.69/2000 seeking assignment of Decree and that Petition was allowed. As against the Order of assignment of Decree, the Petitioner preferred CRP No.1123/2001, which was dismissed by the Order dated 20.06.2001. Special Leave Petition preferred against that Order was also dismissed. When the matters stood thus, in August 2001, the Petitioner filed M.P.No.568/2001 to condone the delay of 1586 days in filing the application for restoration of appeal. M.P.Nos.569 and 570/2001 were also filed for restoration of RCA No.123/1994 and for grant of stay. According to the Petitioner, the counsel engaged by the Custodian did not intimate the factual position of the case and only on initiation of execution proceedings and filing of M.P.No.69/2000, they came to know about the dismissal of RCA No.123/1994. Stating that they have fair chances of success in the appeal, the Petitioner prayed for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration of appeal. By a cryptic common Order, the Appellate Authority has dismissed the applications finding that the delay has not been satisfactorily explained, which is challenged in these Revision Petitions.

4. On behalf of the Petitioner, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.R.Viduthalai has submitted that the lower Court has been carried away by the length of delay and had not kept in view the Race Club Act, Act 26 of 1986 and the challenge of the same before the High Court and the Supreme Court. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that though the delay is enormous, it is substantially accounted for and only if the RCA is restored, many issues raised could be determined. Placing reliance upon a number of decisions, the learned Senior Counsel urged that jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be liberally construed. It was further urged that when there is improper exercise of discretion by the Courts below, the superior Court can consider the matter afresh, untrammelled by the views taken by the Courts below.

5. Countering the arguments, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.Sriram Panchu has submitted that as per the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1996 SC 1153, Management of the Club was ordered to be handed over to the Club before 31.03.1996. Having so taken over the management, the Petitioner Club ought to have been more vigilant in pursuing the RCA. Assiduously collecting the dates and events, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that while the Petitioner Club has been vigorously pursuing M.P.No.69/2000 from January 2000 up to Supreme Court, the Petitioner Club has not satisfactorily explained the reason for the delay at least during the period from January 2000 to August 2001. Placing reliance upon a number of decisions, the learned Senior Counsel further submitted that when the Petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the reason for the inordinate delay and was not reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the Court below has rightly declined to condone the delay and there is no reason calling for interference.

6. It is settled law that Section 5 application is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go into the position of the person concerned and find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which the Petitioner had adduced and whether the cause stated in the circumstances of the case is sufficient. It is the condition precedent for the exercise of discretion that the Court must satisfy itself as to whether there was sufficient cause for exercising such discretion and condoning the delay. The expression 'sufficient cause' should be considered with pragmatism with a justice oriented approach.

7. Both the counsel have relied on a number of decisions. Submitting that discretion vested in the Court dealing with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive liberal consideration, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.Viduthalai placed reliance upon -

1999 (3) LW 649 [Shanmugam Sadacharya Servai Vs. Thirugnanam Servai and another

2000 (1) LW 547 [V. Amudha Vs. S.A. Arumugham and others]

2002 (1) CTC 769 [Ram Natha Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and others Vs. Gobardhan Sao & Others]

2001 (1) CTC 727 [C. Selvaraj Vs. M. Subramani]

1999 (1) CTC 238 [Shriram Chits and Investments (P) Ltd. vs. M. Krishnan and others]

2006 (1) CTC 191 [S. Mohan Vs. Cruz Mary]

8. Useful reference could be made to the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2005 (3) SCC 752 [State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao and others]. The Supreme Court has elaborately discussed the scope and discretion in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and has held as follows:-

"8. The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction (sic discretion) vested in the Court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy [AIR 1998 SC 3222] it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.

9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs.Shanti Misra [1975 (2) SCC 840] this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram [AIR 1917 PC 156] it was observed that true guide for a Court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [1969 (1) SCR 1006] a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

10. In concord of India Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs. Nirmala Devi [1979 (4) SCC 365] which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din Vs. A. Narayanan [1969 (2) SCC 770], this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bonafide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bonafide and it was not tainted by any malafide motive.

11. In State of Kerala Vs. E.K. Kuriyipe [1981 Supp SCC 72], it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi Vs. Dina Nath [1982 (3) SCC 366] it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the Order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merit.

12. In O.P.Kathapalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh [1984 (4) SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji [1987 (2) SCC 107] a Bench of two Judges considered the question of limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in Order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of the matters on merit. The expression 'sufficient cause' is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice – that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common-sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respect on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal". [underlining added].

9. True test is whether the Petitioner has acted with due diligence or can negligence or inaction or malafide could be attributed to the applicant. In the instant case, let us consider whether the delay was due to negligence or want of bonafide on the part of the Petitioner.

10. Eviction Petition was filed on 09.07.1987 against the Custodian of the Race Club. At that time, i.e. from 09.04.1986 the Madras Race Club [Acquisition sand Transfer of Undertaking] Act, 1986, was in force. The Act was to provide for acquisition, for a public purpose, and transfer of the undertaking of the Madras Race Club and for matters connected therewith or incidentally thereto. Constitutional validity of Race Club Act was challenged. In the decision [dated 12.01.1996] reported in AIR 1996 SC 1153 [Dr.K.R.Lakshmanan Vs.State of Tamil Nadu and another], the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Act are discriminatory and arbitrary and as such, violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Act was struck down as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While striking down the validity of the Act, the Supreme Court has directed handing over of Management, which reads as follows:-

"47. We direct the Committee of Management under the Chairmanship of Justice S. Natarajan appointed by this Court to hand over the management, functioning and operation of the club to a duly constituted Management Committee, under the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the club, before March 21, 1996. We leave the parties to bear their own costs."

11. Race Club Act 26/1996 was thus in force from 1986 to 12.01.1996, the validity of which was challenged before the Courts and the same was pending. During the interregnum period, in July 1987, Eviction Petition was filed and eviction was ordered on 04.10.1993. Only the Custodian has contested the Eviction Petition and RCA No.123/1994 was filed in 1994 by the Custodian.

12. The Supreme Court Ordered handing over of management before 31.03.1996. Thereafter, the Race Club has regained its managing capacity. From the available records, the actual date of taking over management is not known. It may be noted that the Petitioner Race Club was divested of the managerial position for more than ten years. Therefore, even after taking over the management, it must have taken quite some time to take stock of the entire affairs and assume effective control over the affairs. The Petitioner Club cannot be blamed for not immediately taking steps in pursuing RCA No.123/1994. During 1996-97, quite probably, the Race Club might have been preoccupied with transition of management and cannot be faulted for not pursuing the RCA. 

13. As noted earlier, the Respondent in the Eviction Petition was the then Custodian of Race Club, who was a Government Nominee. By perusal of the records, it is seen that custodian was represented by the then City Government Pleader. In view of the pendency of the Rent Control proceedings for quite some time, there might have been change in the office of the City Government Pleader also. In the supporting affidavit, the Petitioner has averred "the counsel engaged by the Custodian did not intimate the factual position of the case". Viewed in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the above averments cannot be disbelieved. 

14. As noted earlier, rent control proceedings were initiated in 1987, only after the Race Club Act came into force. The reasons stated in paragraph 3 that the counsel engaged by the Custodian did not intimate the factual position of the case is quite acceptable. Normally, when the matters are entrusted to the counsel, particularly appeals, parties repose confidence in the counsel and they remain confident that their lawyer would look after their case. This is all the more so in appeals, since in the appeals, personal appearance of the party is not required. 

15. In a case where the appeal was dismissed for default owing to appellant's counsel, in AIR 1981 SC 1400 [Rafiq and another Vs. Munshilal and another], holding that the lawyer's mistake should not prejudice the party, the Supreme Court has observed as under: -

"The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him an then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things. The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the Court's procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watch-dog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job".

16. Contending that it is unthinkable that Race Club after taking over management had been negligent in not contacting their counsel to know about the stage of RCA and the subsequent period, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.Sriram Panchu has drawn the attention of the Court to the following decisions: -

2001 (3) CTC 536 [Mannariah & Sons (P) Ltd. & Others Vs. Sankaranarayanan]

2006 (2) LW 99 [Kaliammal and others Vs. Sundharammal and another]

2006 (5) CTC 822 [The Management of Southern Railway Tondiarpet Marshalling Yard Staff Cooperative Staff Canteen Vs. Wormken of Southern Railway Tondiarpet Marshalling Yard Staff Cooperative Staff Canteen]

In those decisions, in the facts and circumstances of the case obtaining thereon, the Courts have held that the delay is not satisfactorily explained. Whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

17. M.P.No.69/2000 was filed by the fourth Respondent Bukhari seeking assignment of Decree on 22.12.1999. They have also filed E.P.No.504/2000. According to the Petitioners, only on receipt of notice in M.P.No.69/2000, they came to know about the execution proceedings and engaged counsel in E.P.No.504/2000. As against the Order of allowing of M.P.No.69/2000, the Petitioner has preferred CRP No.1123/2001 which was dismissed on 26.06.2001, challenging which, S.L.P.No.14937/2001 was filed and the same was dismissed by the Supreme Court. On behalf of the Respondents, the main contention urged is that when the Petitioner received notice in execution proceedings and M.P.No.69/2000 in January 2000, in all probability the Petitioner must have had knowledge about the dismissal of R.C.A.No.123/19994 for default. It was further submitted that as against the Order of M.P.No.69/2000, the Petitioner was vigorously pursuing the matter by filing CRP and also SLP. Main contention of the Respondents is that from January 2000 to August 2001, the inordinate delay remains unexplained which clearly shows malafide on the part of the Petitioner. It was further submitted that while the Petitioners have been filing numerous Petitions and appeals before various Courts since 2000, steps for restoration of the appeal was not then filed, which clearly shows the intention of the Petitioner to delay the execution proceedings. It was further submitted that it is unfair to reopen the matter nearly after 13 years and dispute the right at the stage of execution.

18. True, the Petitioner has been vigorously pursuing M.P.No.69/2000, in which the purchaser sought assignment of Decree by filing CRP and SLP. Though the Petitioner has fought out M.P.No.69/2000 upto the Supreme Court, the Petitioner did not takes steps to look into the stage of RCA. The reason is explained in Paragraph 3 of the affidavit that the then counsel did not guide the Petitioner in a proper manner and only on engagement of counsel, the Petitioner came to know about the details of rent control proceedings. The explanation offered by the Petitioner is quite acceptable.

19. After engaging the lawyer, normally the party acts by the advice of the Advocate by reposing confidence in the lawyer. When RCA was filed, Petitioner Club was not in the picture. Only the Custodian - Government nominee was on record. Regarding impleading of the Respondents 4 to 7 in the appeal [as per Order in M.P.No.1360/1996], the Petitioner Club may or may not have had knowledge. In any event, RCA was then pending and quite reasonably, the Petitioner Club remained confident that their lawyer would take care of the matter. Challenging of M.P.No.69/2000 and the various forums in which it was challenged are eloquent enough to show that the Petitioner Club was vigorously pursuing the matter in collateral proceedings of the Rent control Proceedings. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of negligence, inaction or malafide.

20. Though the delay is a long range of delay, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay is properly explained. The Madras Race Club [Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking] Act, 1986, was in force and the Government Custodian – Government Nominee was in management of the affairs of the Race Club. In 1996, there was handing over of management and 1996-1997 was the transition period. After the Petitioner received notices in M.P.No.69/2000 and the execution proceedings, the Petitioner Club had taken all efforts in diligently pursuing the matter. The Petitioner Club cannot be blamed for not taking steps for restoration of the appeal from January 2000 to August 2001.

21. It may be pertinent to mention the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel Mr.Viduthalai that the Petitioner Club has substantial defence to put forth in the Rent Control Appeal. It was submitted that initiation of eviction proceedings when the Madras Race Club [Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking] Act, 1986 was in force and maintainability of Eviction Petition has to be gone into. It was further submitted that willful default is a related aspect arising out of bonafide denial of title. It was further submitted that the requirement of the premises for owner's occupation and the subsequent selling of the premises may not go together and these are some of the substantial defences which the Club has to raise in the appeal. Only by restoration of RCA, the Petitioner can contest the matter on merits. 

22. Under Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings [Lease and Rent Control] Act, 1960, the Appellate Authority has wide powers and the Appellate Authority has to independently consider the matter. If the RCA is not restored, the eviction Order passed would become final and it would amount to shutting the door to the Petitioner. In the words of the Supreme Court "it must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds, but because it is capable of removing injustice, and is expected to do so". Declining to condone the delay in filing the Petition for restoration of the appeal would result in serious miscarriage of justice and shutting doors to the Petitioner. At this juncture, we may usefully refer to 1988 (2) SCC 142 [Ramegowda Vs.Special Land Acquisition Officer]. Generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In the present case, there is delay in filing application for restoration of the appeal. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. Declining to condone the delay in filing the application for restoration of appeal would result in serious miscarriage of Justice. The Respondents cannot be allowed to have the benefit of the unchallenged eviction Order passed by the Rent Controller.

23. The Court below has not properly considered the Race Club Act being in force and the challenge of the same before the Higher Courts. There is no proper exercise of discretion in declining to condone the delay. The lower Court has not properly exercised the discretion in declining to condone the delay. If the discretion exercised is not proper, it is open to the Superior Court to consider the cause shown afresh and come to its own finding. I find that the Revision Petitioner has made out sufficient cause for condonation of delay. With a view to afford opportunity to the Petitioner Club to contest the eviction Order, the appeal, RCA No.123/1994 has to be restored. The impugned Order is to be set aside and these Revision Petitions are to be allowed.

24. In the result, order dated 04.01.2002 passed in M.P.Nos.568, 569, 570/2001 in R.C.A.No.123/1994 by the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, is set aside and these Revision Petitions are allowed. No costs. Consequently, CMP No.8009/2003 is closed.

25. The Rent Control Appellate Authority is directed to restore RCA No.123/1994 on file and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. The Rent Control Appellate Authority is directed to dispose of RCA No.123/1994 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order.

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Regards

Saravvanan R
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